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By continuing to use our website without changing your settings, you agree to allow us to use cookies and other identifiers. For more information, see our Privacy Policy. On October 26, Kenyan voters will return to the polls for rerun presidential elections. However, these voter groups are so small in Iowa that these shifts had very little effect on the election outcome. Ohio also experienced a very large shift of white non-college-educated voters against Clinton: from percent in to percent in , a margin shift of 15 points.

If that had not occurred the state would have been a toss-up instead of an 8-point victory for Trump. The other support shift that had a significant effect on the outcome in the state was the decline in the Democratic margin among black voters, down 11 points from percent in to percent in North Carolina, a state where a narrow Republican advantage in became slightly larger, saw a fairly modest shift toward Republicans among white non-college-educated voters, although that increase was on top of an already massive deficit—from percent in to percent in That shift, by itself, would have made the state much closer had it not happened, but it would not have flipped the state to Clinton.

As for white college graduates, our data indicate that there was a very large shift toward Clinton in the state, from a percent deficit in to a percent advantage in —the exit polls, in contrast, showed a large Democratic deficit among this group in both elections.

Among black voters, we again estimate a shift against Clinton, this time from percent to percent. But among white college-educated voters, Clinton turned a percent deficit from into a virtual tie, percent, in In Georgia, as in Arizona, our data indicate improvements for the Democrats among both white non-college-educated and white college-educated voters.

And as in Arizona, the shift toward Clinton was much larger among white college graduates, cutting a percent deficit in to percent. That shift made the largest contribution—4 points versus 2 points from the white non-college-educated shift—to reducing the Republican victory margin in the state.

Finally, in Texas, we also found improvement for the Democrats among both white non-college-educated and college-educated voters. But the shift toward Clinton among white college graduates in the state was much larger—from a percent deficit in to percent in , a margin improvement of 18 points.

But that helped Clinton to the tune of only half a percentage point. Since the election there has been a vigorous and, to our eyes, healthy debate regarding what happened in The barely concealed subtext of this conversation is an argument about what would have altered the results and how the parties should invest their time and resources in upcoming elections.

These simulations are not an endorsement of any given strategy nor should they be read as such. It may very well be the case that simulations that produce the biggest Electoral College wins or the most secure state-level margins would have been the hardest to achieve.

That said, we had two goals when selecting our simulations. First, we wanted to speak as directly as possible to some of the major narratives that have developed since the election. Many people have strong beliefs regarding what would or would not have resulted in a different election outcome and we thought it necessary that these ideas be interrogated thoroughly.

This goal accounts for our first two simulations. Second, we wanted to explore simulations that told us something interesting about the electorate or more systematic changes that were occurring nationwide. This goal is responsible for our two remaining simulations. Briefly, our four simulations answer the following questions: 8. Each square contains the new vote margin under the assumptions listed above.

In short:. Recreating Black turnout and support levels would have produced a large but delicate Electoral College win for Clinton. Some of the biggest changes observed in were concentrated among African Americans. Nationwide black turnout dropped close to 4. This drop-off, combined with higher turnout rates among other racial groups, resulted in black voters shrinking as a percentage of actual voters—13 percent versus In addition, the percentage of black voters who cast a ballot for Clinton in was about five and half points lower than the number who voted for Obama in Taking these two trends together, some have argued that Clinton could have avoided a loss if she were able to maintain prior levels of support and enthusiasm among black voters.

Our results suggest that this is correct. More than that, this scenario produces the largest Electoral College win of any simulation presented in this report. Several of the states that Obama won in —Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Florida—would have stayed Democratic under these conditions. While all of these states would have seen relatively narrow Democratic wins, Florida—a state that has been a consistent nail-biter on election night—would have gone to Clinton by just 0.

In addition, North Carolina, a state that Obama did not win in , would also have gone Democratic due to a convergence of other trends. First, the share of eligible voters who were white and non-college-educated dropped by about 2. The effect of this demographic shift was blunted by the rising turnout rates of these remaining eligible voters, but this still represents a big change in the state. Second, the voting behavior of white college-educated voters in North Carolina shifted radically between these two elections—a simultaneous shift away from the Republican Party and toward the Democratic Party resulted in a majority of these voters pulling the lever for Clinton.

While this first simulation produces the largest Electoral College win out of all our simulations, this says nothing about the difficulty of achieving it. In line with the historic nature of those elections, black turnout and support for Democrats were the highest ever seen in the modern political era. It may very well be the case that recreating those levels of support and enthusiasm is unrealistic outside of that context.

In fact, the overall levels of support and turnout among African Americans in bear a striking resemblance to —the last pre-Obama election. Rather than signifying a dramatic loss for the Democratic Party, these changes may represent a return to customary voting behaviors. Let us suppose for a moment that these difficulties are real. What if Democrats, even with a concerted effort, had only been able to split the difference between the and turnout rates and support rates of African Americans?

This would not have resulted in a Democratic win; Clinton still would have lost Florida, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. A return to just the turnout or support levels of would not have produced a win for Clinton in Recreating turnout levels would only have resulted in Democratic wins in Michigan and Wisconsin, while support levels would have netted just Michigan and Pennsylvania.

Recreating white non-college-educated support levels would have produced a large and relatively secure Electoral College win for Clinton. Another important shift observed in was among white non-college-educated voters. In aggregate, Clinton lost significant vote share among this group compared to Obama— These vote shifts, combined with the strong clustering of white non-college-educated voters in the Midwest and Appalachia see Figure 5 , played a pivotal role in the election.

Taken together, some have argued that Clinton could have avoided a loss if she were able to maintain prior levels of support among white non-college-educated voters. It not only produces a large Electoral College win, but also one that is particularly robust. Several of the states that Obama won in —Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa, and Florida—would have stayed Democratic under these conditions. In the first four of those states this simulation produces relatively robust wins, the narrowest of which is 3.

In contrast, Florida is once again an extremely narrow flip—a margin of about 5, votes making the difference between a Democratic and a Republican win. Notably, this simulation does not produce a Democratic win in Ohio despite the fact that Obama won that state in While this second simulation produces secure wins in several key states, this exercise says nothing about the difficulty of achieving it. The first group represents individuals who identified as Democrats in and voted for Obama in the last election, but changed their party affiliation and voted for Trump or a third-party candidate in According to data from the Pew Research Center, there has been a sharp decline in the number of white voters without a college degree who identify as Democrats in the last 10 years.

The shift among white voters with some college was less dramatic—from a 4-point Republican advantage in to a point advantage in —but still represents a large change in such a short time period. The second category is made up of individuals who have traditionally identified as or voted for Republicans but voted for Obama in While people have grown accustomed to thinking about those who voted for Obama in but not Clinton in as Democratic defectors, the reality is that some portion of these voters were really Republican defectors in and have now returned to their customary voting behavior.

Taken together, there is substantial reason to think that a good portion of these white non-college-educated voters were unlikely to vote Democratic in While additional resources aimed at reaching out might have resulted in smaller shifts, it seems unlikely that any discrete intervention in would have fully recreated the margins observed in Let us assume for a moment that the difficulties described above are real.

What if Democrats, even with a concerted effort, had only been able to split the difference between the and support rates of white non-college-educated voters? Under these conditions, Clinton still would have taken Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, and therefore won the election. The size of these wins is obviously smaller, but the narrowest is still a 1. Our simulation predicts that Clinton still would have carried these three Rust Belt states, with Pennsylvania now going Democratic by a very narrow 0.

On its own, Latino support returning to its levels would not have altered the outcome of the election or the outcome of any state. The simulation clearly has the biggest effect in Florida, but results in no Electoral College change.

In many ways was about the U. No demographic exemplified that more than Latino voters. According to our analysis, the percent voting Democratic declined 3. While no one has seriously argued that the election hinged on changes in Latino voting behavior, we found this simulation worthwhile to explore given the rising influence and unique electoral features of this group.

As expected, our results suggest that a return to levels of support would not have resulted in a win for Clinton. Geographically, Latinos can almost be considered an inverse image of white non-college-educated voters. While the latter had an outsized influence on the election because of their geographic distribution, the former punches below its weight.

Latino voters tend to be concentrated in a relatively small number of counties in the country and those counties tend to be located in non-swing states. The three states with the largest percentage of Latino voters—New Mexico, California, and Texas—were uncontested in and probably will be for at least several more presidential cycles. Of the next three—Arizona, Florida, and Nevada—only Florida is a true swing state, at least for now.

That said, our simulation shows that even in this relatively high population state, Latino voters shifting back to their support levels would not have closed the gap for Clinton. It still would have missed the mark by about 5, votes. State-level demographic changes were not pivotal in , but they did create conditions that were generally more favorable for Clinton.

Absent any changes in the eligible voter population, several states that Trump won narrowly would have been much safer for him. The simulation results in no Electoral College change. Demographics may not be destiny, but in the short term it is reasonable to quantify the effects of demographic changes on election outcomes.

Our fourth simulation measures this very thing: What would the election look like if there had not been any demographic changes in the past four years?

We held turnout and support rates constant, but fed them into the demographics that were observed back in The effect is nearly universal—the demographic changes observed since have created an electoral landscape that is slightly more favorable to Democrats. Had the population somehow remained unchanged during this time period, we expect Clinton would have won the national vote by 1.

While these changes did not prove pivotal in any state, the estimated effect is still rather substantial. He warned the chief justice that as the poll had been annulled he was now the president again, not president-elect.

Maraga should know that he is now dealing with the serving president," Mr Kenyatta said. But let us deal with the election first. We are not afraid. Chairman Wafula Chebukati noted the ruling and said there would be "changes to personnel" ahead of the new election. He invited the director of public prosecutions "to prosecute any of our staff that may have been involved in violations". But he ruled out resigning, saying he had not been accused of wrongdoing. After the election, international monitors from the EU, the African Union and the US had said there was no major fraud on polling day and urged Mr Odinga to concede.

On Friday, Marietje Schaake, the head of the EU Observer Mission, said the court ruling represented "a historic day for Kenya and we have always said that people who feel aggrieved should seek the path of the courts". She said the monitors had at the time pointed to irregularities and encouraged the Kenyan authorities to deal with them.

Ms Schaake said the monitors were awaiting the full details of the ruling. Raila Odinga will feel vindicated against accusations that he was just being a bad loser in challenging President Kenyatta's win.

However, this historic decision is a massive indictment of the electoral commission. It is therefore no surprise that the opposition Nasa coalition is now calling for a new team to manage the next elections. This is also a setback for the international, and some local, election observers, who profusely praised the election as free, fair and credible. Regardless of the winners and losers following the ruling, this is a proud moment for Kenya.